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Abstract
We analyze the e¤ects of resale through bargaining in multi-object uniform-price auctions
with asymmetric bidders. The possibility of resale a¤ects biddersstrategies, and hence the
allocation of the objects on sale and the sellers revenue. Our experimental design consists of
four treatments: one without resale and three resale treatments that vary both the bargaining
mechanism and the amount of information available in the resale market. As predicted
by theory: (i) without resale, asymmetry among bidders reduces demand reduction; (ii)
resale increases demand reduction by high-value bidders; (iii) low-value bidders speculate
by bidding more aggressively with resale. Therefore, resale induces speculation and demand
reduction which reduce auction e¢ ciency. In contrast to what is usually argued, resale does
not necessarily increase nal e¢ ciency and may not reduce the sellers revenue. Features of
the resale market that tend to increase its e¢ ciency also reduce the sellers revenue.
JEL Classication: D44, C90.
Keywords: multi-object auctions, resale, asymmetric bidders, bargaining, economic exper-
iments.
We would like to thank Ciro Avitabile, Vincent Crawford, Dan Levin, Tim Salmon, and Anastasia Semykina
for extremely helpful comments, as well as seminar participants at the University of Padova, the University of
Verona, the University of Milan Bicocca, the 2011 ASFEE Conference, ESA Chicago-Luxembourg, the CSEF-
IGIER Symposium on Economics and Institutions in Anacapri, and the 2nd EIEF-UNIBO Workshop on Industrial
Organization. We would also like to thank Webster University Geneva for funding this project.
yDepartment of Economics and CSEF, Università di Napoli Federico II, Via Cintia (Monte S. Angelo), 80126
Napoli, Italy. Email: pagnozzi@unina.it.
zGeorge Herbert Walker School of Business and Technology, Webster University Geneva, Route de Collex 15,
CH-1293 Bellevue, Switzerland. Email: jabs@webster.ch.
1. Introduction
Auctions are often characterized by the possibility of resale by winning bidders, which may dra-
matically alter the outcome from what would have been observed without resale. U.S. Treasury
Bills and the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) program to sell CO2 allowances are
two economically relevant examples of auctions with an active resale market, and in the latter
auction prices are in general lower than resale prices (Zhou, 2011)  a discrepancy that hints
at the impact of resale. In spectrum auctions, bidders are typically allowed to trade the licenses
acquired, and it is relatively common to observe small bidders winning and then reselling to
larger ones.1
Post-auction resale may exist because of asymmetry in bidders valuations (Hafalir and
Krishna, 2008; Zheng, 2002), valuations changing after the auction (Haile, 2001, 2003; Gupta
and Lebrun, 1999), and potential bidders unable to participate in the auction (Milgrom, 1987).
In this paper, however, we will focus on resale emerging because of the strategic choices of
bidders in the auction (Garrat and Tröger, 2006; Pagnozzi, 2010).
In fact, in multi-object auctions bidders have an incentive to reduce demand  i.e., bid less
than their valuations for marginal units, in order to reduce the auction price and pay less for
inframarginal units (Wilson, 1979; Ausubel and Cramton, 1998)  and the possibility of resale
exacerbates this incentive since bidders will have a chance to purchase, in the resale market,
a unit that they do not acquire in the auction. Moreover, even bidders with low values have
an incentive to speculate and bid especially aggressively in an auction if they know they will
have a chance to resell the objects acquired. Both speculation and demand reduction make it
more likely that the allocation of the objects on sale in the auction will be ine¢ cient, and hence
that bidders will be willing to trade in a post-auction resale market. So the possibility of resale
a¤ects both e¢ ciency and the sellers revenue.
To explore these e¤ects, we theoretically and experimentally examine the impact of resale in
multi-object auctions with asymmetric bidders. Specically, we consider a uniform-price auction
with two identical units on sale and two bidders, one strong and one weak. The strong bidder has
a higher valuation and demands both units; the weak bidder has a lower valuation and demands
only one unit.2 Considering bidders with di¤erent characteristics allows us to distinguish the
di¤erent bidding strategies that they adopt in the auction, and the di¤erent e¤ects that the
presence of a resale market has on these strategies. We assume that resale takes place through a
post-auction bargaining procedure between bidders, so that bidders share the gains from trade
1For example, in the UK 3.4 GHz auction, two small bidders, Red Spectrum and Public Hub, won one license
each and resold them to Pacic Century Cyberworks, a much larger company that was considered to have the
highest valuation for the licenses on sale in the auction but chose not to outbid its competitors (Pagnozzi, 2010).
In the 2000 UK auction, Orange won a 3G mobile-phone license and was later acquired by NTL (a consortium
controlled by France Telecom) that participated in the same auction but did not win any license.
2For example, in an auction for geographically di¤erentiated mobile phone licenses, a strong bidder can be
interpreted as an incumbent operator who aims at acquiring a nationwide license, while a weak bidder can be
interpreted as a new and smaller entrant, possibly interested only in a local license, or even as a pure speculator.
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in the resale market, if there are any.
In this context, without resale it is a dominant strategy for a weak bidder to bid up to
his valuation for a unit. By contrast, when resale is allowed, a weak bidder speculates by
bidding more than his valuation, because winning the auction has the additional option value
of providing a chance of reselling to the strong bidder (Haile, 2003; Garratt and Tröger, 2006;
Pagnozzi, 2007).
Our theoretical analysis also shows that, although strong bidders may benet from a demand
reduction strategy that reduces the auction price, asymmetry among biddersvaluations reduces
the incentive to reduce demand, because it is more costly to lose an object for a bidder with a
higher valuation, and less costly to outbid a competitor with a lower valuation. Without resale,
strong bidders with relatively high valuations outbid weak bidders and win both units; while
strong bidders with relatively low valuations reduce demand for the second unit and allow the
weak bidder to win one unit. The presence of resale, however, may dramatically change this
result: resale makes demand reduction more attractive for strong bidders, because it provides
them with a second opportunity to purchase a unit not acquired in the auction. Accordingly,
with resale, strong bidders always reduce demand, regardless of their valuations (Pagnozzi, 2009,
2010).
In order to both test and inform the theory of multi-object auctions with resale, we con-
ducted a series of controlled laboratory experiments with four treatments: No Resale, Complete
Information Resale, Incomplete Information Resale, and Bargain. The no resale treatment con-
sisted of subjects only participating in an ascending auction. The complete information and the
incomplete information resale treatments involved a secondary market after the auction where
one of the two bidders was randomly chosen to make a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er to the other bid-
der.3 In the rst of these treatments, subjects were given complete information regarding the
competitorsvalues in the resale market, while in the second, information was restricted to the
distribution of the competitorsvalues. In the bargain treatment, we extended the incomplete
information resale treatment to an unstructured bargaining game where both subjects were al-
lowed to make multiple o¤ers and to communicate through computerized chat during the resale
stage.4
We analyze di¤erent resale mechanisms in order to investigate how the outcome of the resale
market, and its e¤ects on biddersstrategies in the auction, depend on the specic procedure
adopted by bidders to trade after the auction. The complete and incomplete information resale
treatments consider a static and more structured resale market, where each bidder expects to be
given full bargaining power with equal probability. The bargain treatment extends this simple
3This resale mechanism was analyzed by Calzolari and Pavan, 2006.
4Feltovich and Swierzbinski (2011) use a similar approach with computerized chat in an unstructured bar-
gaining game experiment studying the role of cheap talk. See Roth and Malouf (1979) and Roth and Murnighan
(1982) for earlier examples of experiments with bargaining proposals accompanied by messaging. For a survey
on the role of communication in experiments see Crawford (1998) and for a survey of bargaining experiments see
Roth (1995).
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environment in an attempt to replicate a more exible, and arguably more realistic, post-auction
bargaining procedure among auction bidders. To the best of our knowledge, we are the rst
to consider an unstructured bargaining procedure to experimentally analyze post-auction resale
markets.
Consistent with the theoretical predictions, we show that in the no resale treatment weak
bidders bid up to their value. This result parallels earlier work in single unit ascending auctions
(e.g., Coppinger et al., 1980; Kagel et al., 1987), and conrms the robustness of value bidding
in the multi-object context.5 We also nd that the addition of a resale market signicantly
increases weak biddersbids, indicating speculation, regardless of the specic structure of the
resale market.
Also consistent with the theoretical predictions on demand reduction, in the no resale treat-
ment strong bidders drop out at low prices with much higher frequency when their valuation is
relatively low. This complements previous experimental results that have shown the prevalence
of demand reduction in ascending auctions when bidders are symmetric (e.g., Alsemgeest et
al., 1998; Kagel and Levin, 2001, 2005; Engelmann and Grimm, 2009; Goeree et al., 2012):6
strong bidders do engage in demand reduction, but value asymmetry between bidders tends to
reduce demand reduction when resale is not allowed. By contrast, with resale strong bidders
reduce demand regardless of their valuations, by dropping out at very low prices and they do so
signicantly more than without resale, especially if they have high values. The largest amount
of demand reduction occurs in the complete information resale and bargain treatments.
Comparing the di¤erent resale treatments, the incomplete information treatment generated
higher uncertainty of the resale outcome, because it involved a less exible trading mechanism
with lower information for subjects. As a result, strong bidders tended to reduce demand less
than in the bargain and the complete information resale treatments. Moreover, weak bidders
tended to speculate less in the incomplete information and bargain resale treatments than in the
complete information resale treatment, because they correctly expected to obtain higher resale
prot in the latter.
In summary, as predicted by theory, our experimental analysis shows that asymmetry and
resale a¤ect biddersstrategy in an auction: (i) without resale strong bidders reduce demand
much less often when they have high valuations; (ii) the possibility of resale increases demand
reduction by strong bidders; (iii) weak bidders bid more aggressively when they have a chance
to resell.
Beyond the results specically related to bidding, our experiments also allow us to analyze
the e¤ect of post-auction resale on e¢ ciency and the sellers revenue. It is often argued that
5McCabe et al., (1990) also provide evidence of value bidding for bidders with single-unit demand in multi-
unit ascending auctions. See Kagel (1995) for a comprehensive overview of experimental data on value bidding
in single-unit auctions. Also see Kagel and Levin (2011) and Kwasnica and Sherstyuk (2012) for a broad survey
of more recent experimental results in multi-object auctions.
6The literature shows that demand reduction, although present in various types of multi-object auctions, is
more pronounced in open ascending than in sealed-bid auctions (Kagel and Levin, 2001). List and Lucking-Reiley
(2000) also nd evidence of demand reduction in eld experiments.
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resale after an auction should always be allowed, because it always increases e¢ ciency by allowing
bidders to trade, if they are willing to do so, in the presence of gains from trade. But our analysis
suggests that this is not necessarily the case. Although resale does increase e¢ ciency after the
auction, it also has a signicant e¤ect on biddersstrategies during the auction, and these tend
to reduce auction e¢ ciency. In fact, in all resale treatments auction e¢ ciency is lower than in
the treatment without resale. Yet, the net e¤ect is ambiguous: in the incomplete information
resale treatment, nal e¢ ciency is not signicantly di¤erent from nal e¢ ciency without resale;
while in the two other resale treatments nal e¢ ciency is higher.
The net e¤ect of resale on revenue is also ambiguous. In theory, allowing resale should
always reduce the sellers revenue, because it should induce strong bidders to reduce demand,
thus reducing the auction price, possibly down to zero (or to the reserve price, if one is present).
Our experimental results, however, indicate that allowing resale increases the sellers revenue
when strong bidders do not reduce demand, since weak bidders bid more aggressively with
resale than without, thereby increasing the auction price. On balance, the sellers revenue in
the treatment without resale is not signicantly higher than in the treatment with resale under
incomplete information, but it is signicantly higher than either the bargain or the complete
information resale treatment.
We also analyze how the e¢ ciency of the resale market depends on the resale mechanism
adopted by bidders. A more exible bargaining mechanism and more precise information about
the size of the gains from trade increase the probability of successful resale and the resulting nal
e¢ ciency. With take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers in the resale market, the probability of successful resale
is higher when weak bidders choose the resale price, since they tend to make less aggressive
o¤ers that are more likely accepted. However, all of these factors also reduce the sellers revenue
in the auction because, by increasing the e¢ ciency of the resale market, they increase strong
bidders incentive to reduce demand. So there is a trade-o¤ between higher nal post-resale
e¢ ciency and higher revenue in the auction.
The resale price depends on the resale mechanism and is higher when bidders have more
information in the resale market, because in this case the resale seller (weak bidder) manages
to obtain higher prots. However, the resale prot of the resale seller is lower than that of
the resale buyer (strong bidder) in all resale mechanisms. Considering also the auction prot,
weak bidders always obtain higher total prots when resale is allowed, while strong bidders may
obtain lower total prots with resale, depending on the actual resale mechanism. Finally, our
analysis shows that resale prices tend to be higher than auction prices, since intra-bidder resale
takes place when strong bidders reduce demand to allow weak bidders to win, thus reducing the
auction price below the competitive level.7
Our paper contributes to the recent experimental literature on auctions with resale. Exper-
7This is consistent with the evidence from various actual auction markets. For example, in the New Zeland
auctions for import quota licenses held from 1981 to 1991, the prices at which licenses were traded in the secondary
market were 26% higher on average than the auction prices (McAfee et al., 1999).
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iments on single-object auctions with resale include Georganas (2011), Georganas and Kagel
(2011), Lange et al. (2011), Saral (2012)  that test how the presence of a resale market a¤ects
bidding behavior  and Harstad (2012)  that analyzes the e¤ects of aftermarkets on e¢ ciency.
In these papers resale takes place either automatically, through another auction, or through a
take-it-or-leave-it o¤er by the auction winner. Filiz-Ozbay et al. (2012) provide the only other
experimental analysis of multi-object auctions with resale that we are aware of. They consider
the e¤ects of complementarities in comparing the e¢ ciency of a Vickrey auction and indepen-
dent second-price auctions and assume that, in the resale market, the auction winner makes
take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers to the losers, separately for each object acquired. Hence, the results of
Filiz-Ozbay et al. (2012) complement ours, since they focus on the e¤ects of a specic resale
mechanism on di¤erent auction formats, in the presence of more complex biddersvaluations.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a theoretical analysis of
the model that we refer to for our experimental design, and its predictions in terms of bidding
strategies, e¢ ciency and the sellers revenue. Section 3 discusses the design of our experiments,
and Section 4 presents the experimental results. Specically, Sections 4.1 and 4.2 shows bidding
behavior by weak and strong bidders respectively, Section 4.3 discusses e¢ ciency and the sellers
revenue, and Section 4.4 analyzes subjects behavior in the resale market. Finally, Section
5 concludes with a summary and discussion of our results. The Appendix contains sample
instructions and screenshots from our experiments.
2. Model and Theoretical Predictions
We construct the simplest possible model that will allow us to experimentally investigate the
e¤ects of resale on bidding strategies by asymmetric bidders, and on their incentives to reduce
demand and speculate.
Auction. There is a (sealed-bid) uniform-price auction for 2 units of an identical good, where
the reserve price is normalized to zero: each player submits 2 non-negative bids, one for each of
the units; the 2 highest bids are awarded the units; and the winner(s) pay a price equal to the
3rd-highest bid for each unit won. We consider a uniform-price auction because it is the auction
mechanism in which the incentive to reduce demand arises more clearly and because it is widely
used to allocate multiple objects.8 The qualitative results of the analysis, however, also hold
for any mechanism to allocate multiple units in which players face a trade-o¤ between winning
more units and paying lower prices. The auction may be followed by a resale market.
Bidders and Valuations. There are 2 risk-neutral asymmetric bidders. Bidders di¤er both in the
number of units that they demand, and in their valuations for those units. Specically, bidder
S, the strong bidder, demands 2 units and has valuation vS  U

vS ; vS

for each unit on sale
8Of course, the uniform-price auction is not an optimal mechanism in our context, neither with resale nor
without resale.
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(i.e., he has at demand);9 bidder W , the weak bidder, demands 1 unit only and has valuation
vW  U

vW ; vW

for that unit. Bidders are privately informed about their valuations, which
are independent. We assume that vS  vW , so that bidder S always has a higher valuation
than bidder W , and bidders know the ex-post e¢ cient allocation of the units on sale before
the auction. For simplicity, we also assume that bidder W cannot win more than 1 unit in the
auction, even if resale is allowed.
Our assumption on biddersvaluations ensures that in our experiments bidders know the
role they will have in the resale market when they bid in the auction  i.e., whether they will
have a chance to buy or sell in the resale market  allowing us to focus on the di¤erent bidding
strategies of the two types of bidders and on how these strategies are a¤ected by the possibility
of resale. The assumption also implies that bidders know there are gains from trade in the resale
market if W wins a unit.
Resale Market. When resale is allowed after the auction, if bidder W wins a unit he can resell
it to bidder S. In contrast to previous experiments on auctions with resale that assume a
more restricted structure for the resale market,10 we assume that resale takes place through
bargaining between bidders. We believe that this is a more realistic representation of many
real-life situations in which bidders attempt to trade after an auction but do not follow a formal
trading mechanism (e.g., because no bidder has the bargaining power to impose his preferred
trading mechanism) and may be unable to trade even if they know there are mutual gains from
doing so (e.g., because of incomplete information).
When they bid in the auction, both bidders expect to obtain some share of the gains from
trade in the resale market. The actual gains from trade in the resale market are vS   vW (since
Ws outside option when he trades in the resale market is equal to his valuation, while Ss
outside option is zero). In order to capture di¤erent bargaining mechanisms, we assume that
bargaining in the resale market results in S obtaining a share  of the gains from trade and W
obtaining a share 1  of the gains from trade. This can be interpreted as bidders trading at a
resale price
r  vW + (1  ) (vS   vW ) = vW + (1  ) vS :
Our results are robust to many alternative models of the resale market and hold for any sharing
of the gains from trade in the resale market that is individually rational for bidder W (i.e., such
that the resale price is not lower than Ws valuation).11
9All our qualitative results also hold in the presence of complementarities, although bidder Ss incentive to
reduce demand is lower in this case, if there is a chance that he may not manage to acquire the second unit in
the resale market.
10Georganas (2011) and Harstad (2012) use a secondary auction for the resale market, while Georganas and
Kagel (2011) and Filiz-Ozbay et al. (2012) utilize take-it-or-leave it o¤ers by the auction winner. Lange et al.
(2011) and Saral (2012) assume automatic transfers to bidders with higher valuations.
11All our results also hold if the resale market is not necessarily e¢ cient  for example, if bidders fail to trade
in the resale market with positive, but not too high, probability. Alternatively, an ine¢ cient resale market can
be interpreted as S obtaining a share  and W obtaining a share  of the gains from trade, with +  < 1 but
not too low.
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In our experiments, we consider di¤erent bargaining mechanisms for the resale market. In
one mechanism, if bidderW wins a unit in the auction, bidders are allowed to freely bargain over
the resale price (see Section 3). In another mechanism, one of the two bidders, chosen randomly,
is given the possibility of making a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er to the other bidder (Calzolari and
Pavan, 2006). This second resale mechanism, in which in expectation bidders obtain 12 of the
expected gains from trade in the resale market, is a special case of our class of bargaining
mechanisms, when  = 12 .
Bidding Strategies. There is demand reduction if a bidder bids less than his valuation for a unit,
while there is speculation if a bidder bids more than his valuation for a unit. In a uniform-price
auction without resale, it is a weakly dominant strategy for a bidder to bid his valuation for the
rst unit, exactly as in a single-object second-price auction. Yet, bidder S may nd it protable
to reduce demand and bid less than his valuation for the second unit in order to pay a lower
price for the rst unit in case he loses the second, thus obtaining a higher prot. The logic
is the same as the standard textbook logic for a monopsonist withholding demand: buying an
additional unit increases the price paid for the rst, inframarginal, units. Moreover, when resale
is allowed, bidder W may nd it protable to speculate and bid more than his valuation in the
auction, if he expects to resell the item at a price higher than his valuation in the resale market.
Of course, the auction allocation is ine¢ cient when bidderW wins a unit in the auction (because
he speculates or because bidder S reduces demand).
We will now describe the equilibrium bidding strategies with and without resale. Because
our model has 2 units on sale and a total demand for 3 units, to characterize bidding strategies
it will be su¢ cient to describe Ws bid for one unit, and Ss bid for the second unit. The lowest
of these two bids will be the auction price, and either S will win both units on sale at a price
equal to Ws bid, or the two bidders will win one unit each at a price equal to Ss bid.
2.1. Auction without Resale
Consider an auction without resale. Without resale, it is a weakly dominant strategy for bidder
W to bid his valuation for a unit  i.e., vW .12 Given this strategy, bidder S has a choice
between two alternatives. First, by outbidding W in the auction, S can win two units at an
expected price equal to E [vW ], thus obtaining a prot equal to 2 (vS   E [vW ]). Second, S can
reduce demand and bid 0 for the second unit, thus winning one unit at price 0 and letting W
win the other unit.13 In this case, S obtains a prot equal to vS 0. Therefore, bidder S prefers
to reduce demand and win one unit only rather than outbid bidder W if and only if
vS > 2 (vS   E [vW ]) , vS < 2E [vW ] :
12 If W wins the auction at price p, he earns (vW   p), while if W loses the auction, he earns 0. So he bids a
price such that his prot from winning is equal to zero.
13Of course, reducing demand but bidding a strictly positive price is never an optimal strategy.
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When resale is not allowed, bidder Ss incentive to reduce demand in the auction is lower
when he has a relatively high valuation, because reducing demand and not winning the second
unit is more costly when that unit is more valuable, or when he expects bidder W to have a low
valuation and hence to bid less aggressively, because outbidding bidder W to win the second
unit is less costly. Accordingly, without resale, if vS < 2E [vW ] bidder S and bidder W win one
unit each and the auction price is equal to 0; if vS > 2E [vW ] bidder S wins both units and the
auction price is equal to vW .
2.2. Auction with Resale
Consider an auction with resale. When resale is allowed, a players willingness to pay for a
unit in the auction  i.e., the highest auction price that a player is happy to pay for a unit 
is represented by the price at which he expects to buy or sell a unit in the resale market (e.g.,
Milgrom, 1987).
By assumption, if bidder W wins a unit in the auction, he obtains an actual surplus equal
to (1  ) (vS   vW ) in the resale market. Therefore, bidder W bids
vW + (1  )E [vS   vW j vW ] = vW + (1  )E [vS ]
for a unit on sale in the auction.14 Notice that this can be interpreted as E [rj vW ], the price at
which bidder W expects to sell to bidder S in the resale market. Bidder W speculates because
of the option to resell to bidder S and bids higher than his valuation for a unit, and hence higher
than without resale.
Since bidder W bids his expected resale price in the auction, bidder S has a choice between
two alternatives. First, bidder S can outbid bidder W and win 2 units in the auction at an
expected auction price equal to
E [E [rj vW ]] = E [vW ] + (1  )E [vS ] ;
thus obtaining an expected prot equal to
2 (vS   E [vW ]  (1  )E [vS ]) : (2.1)
Second, bidder S can reduce demand and bid zero for the second unit in the auction, thus
winning one unit at price 0 in the auction and then buying the second unit from bidder W in
resale market at an expected resale price equal to
E [rj vS ] = E [vW ]  (1  ) vS :
14 If W wins a unit in the auction at price p, he obtains an expected prot equal to vW   p +
(1  )E [vS   vW j vW ]; while if W loses the auction, he obtains 0. So he bids a price such that his prot
from winning is equal to zero.
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In this case, S obtains an expected total prot equal to15
vS   0| {z }
auction prot
+ vS   E [rj vS ]| {z }
resale prot
= (1 + ) vS   E [vW ] : (2.2)
Comparing (2.1) and (2.2), bidder S prefers to reduce demand in the auction when resale is
allowed if and only if
(1  ) (2E [vS ]  vS) + E [vW ] > 0 , (1  )
 
vS + vS   vS

+ E [vW ] > 0:
Since this inequality is always satised, bidder S always prefers to reduce demand when resale
is allowed.16 Notice that this result holds for every  and for every vS . Basically, bidder S
is willing to bid a much lower price in the auction because of the option to buy in the resale
market. And demand reduction allows bidder S to win 1 unit at price 0 in the auction and then
purchase the other unit from bidder W at price r in the resale market, rather than pay bidder
Ws expected resale price for both units in the auction. The rst option is more attractive than
the second (unless bidder S expects the resale price to be much higher than bidder W , which
can be the case when vS is very high compared to its ex-ante expected value  see footnote 16
 but this never happens when bidder Ss valuation is uniformly distributed).
As a result, when resale is allowed, S and W win one unit each and then trade in the resale
market. The auction price is equal to 0. (Of course, this can also be interpreted as tacit collusion
among bidders, intended to reduce the sellers revenue.)
Summing up, the theoretical predictions of the model that we test using experimental
methodology are the following.
Result 1. Without resale, bidder W bids vW and bidder S reduces demand if and only if
vS < 2E [vW ].
Result 2. With resale, bidder W bids above vW and bidder S always reduces demand.
Result 3. The allocation of the units on sale in the auction is always ine¢ cient with resale, but
not necessarily without resale. The nal allocation of the units on sale (after resale) is always
e¢ cient with resale, but not necessarily without resale.
Result 4. The sellers revenue is always equal to zero with resale, but not necessarily without
resale.
15Notice that bidder Ss expected prot from resale can also be interpreted as E [vS   vW j vS ], his share of
the expected gains from trade in the resale market.
16More generally  i.e., when bidders valuations are not necessarily uniformly distributed  a su¢ cient
(but not necessary) condition for bidder S always preferring to reduce demand when resale is allowed is that
2E [vS ] > vS .
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3. Experimental Design
The experiment was designed around three primary objectives: (i) analyze bidding behavior in
uniform-price multi-object auctions with asymmetric bidders and no resale; (ii) analyze how
post-auction resale between bidders a¤ects their bidding strategies, e¢ ciency, and the sellers
revenue; (iii) investigate how auction bidders trade in the resale market, and how their strategies
are a¤ected by di¤erent resale mechanisms.
We implemented four treatments, one without resale, and three with di¤erent resale mech-
anisms. The resale mechanisms were designed to evaluate the e¤ects of di¤erent levels of infor-
mation in the resale market on biddersstrategies in the auction, and to check the robustness
of our qualitative results to di¤erent trading procedures in the resale market. Each session of
the experiment consisted of a single treatment, and the recruitment process restricted subjects
participation to a single session. At the beginning of a session subjects were randomly assigned
to either the role of weak or strong bidder and that role assignment remained constant for the
duration of the experiment.
In all treatments, each period began with an ascending clock uniform-price auction for two
items of a hypothetical good. Each auction always had 1 strong bidder and 1 weak bidder.17
The strong bidder was allowed to purchase up to 2 units of the hypothetical good, and randomly
drew his private valuation for each unit from a uniform distribution on the range [30; 50]. The
weak bidder could purchase 1 unit only, and randomly drew his private valuation from a uniform
distribution on the range [10; 30]. Throughout the instructions and the experiment, the strong
bidder was referred to as a 2-unit bidder and the weak bidder as a 1-unit bidder to minimize
labeling e¤ects. During the auction each bidder was given information about the distribution of
his competitors valuation and about the number of units he demanded.
Bidders participated in the auction through a computer interface where they were able to
see a bid clock gradually increasing from 0 in increments of 1, which indicated the auction price
for a unit. To bid in the auction, subjects chose to drop outwhen the clock reached a price at
which they wanted to exit the auction. The auction ended as soon as one bidder dropped out,
and the auction price paid for each unit was equal to the dropout bid. If neither subject dropped
out, the auction ended when the bid clock hit the maximum possible value of the strong bidder,
50, and the units were awarded by random draw. If both subjects dropped out simultaneously,
ties were again broken randomly by the computer program. If a bidder won a unit, he earned
the di¤erence between his value and the price resulting from the auction.
In the treatment without a resale market, the auction determined the nal outcome. In the
three resale treatments, if the weak bidder won a unit, there were gains from trade between
bidders and the resale market immediately started with the same participants from the auction.
Two of the three resale treatments involved a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er where the proposer was
17We use ascending auctions (rather than sealed-bid ones) because they are widely used in the eld and, based
on previous experimental evidence, easier to understand for bidders.
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determined with 50/50 probability. If the weak bidder was selected as the proposer, he had
the opportunity to o¤er a buy price to the strong bidder, who could then accept or reject the
o¤er. Correspondingly, if the strong bidder was selected as the proposer, he had a chance to
o¤er a sell price to the weak bidder, who could then accept or reject the o¤er. Neither of these
two treatments allowed communication between the resale participants and the sole di¤erence
involved the amount of information conveyed to the participants. In the rst case, complete
information of the competitors valuation was provided to each participant after the auction
while in the second, the information provided was limited to the distribution of the competitors
valuation.
The third and nal resale treatment relaxed the no communication and one-shot o¤er con-
straints by implementing an unstructured bargaining game where both the weak and strong
bidder could simultaneously make o¤ers through a computerized o¤er board. Only one posted
o¤er per participant was allowed at a time, but o¤ers could always be changed prior to agree-
ment. Either role could accept the o¤er made by their resale counterpart and the resale stage
terminated once an o¤er was accepted. Throughout the resale stage, bidders could also send
each other messages and discuss the o¤ers through an anonymous chat. Bidders had a time
limit of 3 minutes to reach agreement.18
In all resale treatments, either participant had a choice to exit the resale market without
trading at any point of their choosing. If a resale o¤er was agreed upon, the unit was transferred
from the weak bidder (seller) to the strong bidder (buyer). The weak bidder earned the di¤erence
between the resale price and his value, and the strong bidder earned the di¤erence between his
value and the resale price. If resale failed, both bidders earned 0. Any resale earnings were in
addition to the earnings from the auction. The experimental treatments are summarized below.
1. No Resale: Subjects only participated in the auction.
2. Complete Information Resale (Comp Resale): After the auction, if the weak bidder
won a unit, one of the bidders was randomly chosen to make a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er to
the other and both bidders were given complete information regarding the valuation of the
competitor.
3. Incomplete Information Resale (Incomp Resale): This treatment was identical to the
complete information resale treatment, except that in the resale stage biddersvaluations
were not revealed to the competitors and the o¤er proposer was given a calculator tool
(slide bar of potential o¤ers) to determine the probability that his o¤er led to negative
resale earnings for the responder.
18This was not an overly binding constraint. In the bargain treatment we observe 351 resale markets with 44
(12.5%) timing out before agreement was reached. In a large number of the cases, bidders made their nal o¤ers
with plenty of time remaining on the clock. We conjecture that this is evidence of resale failing because of a
holdout strategy, rather than a binding time limit.
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4. Bargain: After the auction, if the weak bidder won a unit, both bidders were allowed
to make and accept o¤ers and to communicate via anonymous computerized chat in an
unstructured bargaining game.
We conducted 3 sessions for each treatment yielding a total of 12 sessions. The no resale,
complete information resale, and incomplete information resale sessions each consisted of 30
periods. The bargain treatment required more time for each auction/resale round because of
the nature of the resale stage, so each session of this treatment consisted of 20 periods. To ensure
the least amount of changes possible we used the exact same value draws across all sessions. We
had 16 participants in each session, which were randomly assigned to the roles of weak and strong
bidder (8 subjects per role). The subjects were students at Florida State University and were
recruited using ORSEE (Greiner, 2004). All sessions were conducted at the xs/fs laboratory in
March and June, 2011, and October, 2012.
The experiment was programmed using Z-tree software (Fischbacher, 2007), and prior to the
beginning of the paid periods, all subjects were given instructions which included two examples
of bidding behavior and, in the resale treatments, resale market outcomes. To ensure subjects
understanding, they were required to correctly complete a computerized quiz before continuing.
Payo¤s during the experiment were denominated in experimental currency units, ECUs, which
transformed into US dollars at the rate of $0.01 per ECU. Table 3.1 shows the earnings broken
down by type and treatment.
No Resale Comp Resale Incomp Resale Bargain
Weaks Earnings $12.98 $15.84 $14.25 $14.66
Strongs Earnings $23.09 $23.14 $22.52 $20.42
Table 3.1: Average earnings.
4. Experimental Results
In this section, we describe the main results of our experiments. We begin in Sections 4.1 and
4.2 by describing the bidding behavior of weak and strong bidders, respectively, Section 4.3
discusses e¢ ciency and the sellers revenue, while Section 4.4 concludes with subjectsbehavior
in the resale market. All data from all periods is included in the following analysis, unless
explicitly noted.
4.1. Weak Type Bidding
By Results 1 and 2 in Section 2, the weak bidder should bid up to his valuation in the auction
when he cannot resell, while he should bid more than his valuation in all resale treatments.
Figure 4.1 provides a weighted scatterplot of weak biddersdropout bids against their values
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Figure 4.1: Weak Bidding weighted scatterplot of observed bids (dropouts) by weak bidders
versus valuations in the four treatments.
in the four treatments.19 In all scatterplots, the markers are weighted by the frequency with
which each value/bid combination was observed, so that larger markers indicate more frequent
combinations. A line is included to indicate bids equal to values  i.e., the weak bidders
theoretical bidding function without resale. Bids above (below) this line are higher (lower) than
value.
It is clear from the scatterplot that in the no resale treatment (upper left graph of Figure
4.1) the majority of observed bids by weak bidders are equal to value. Quantifying this, we nd
that the mean absolute deviation of bid from value is 0.80 and 83% of observed bids fall within
+/-2 of value. For a more accurate test of value bidding, Table 4.1 presents panel random e¤ects
bid regression results on observed bids for the no resale treatment.20 Supporting the theoretical
prediction of value bidding, in the regression model the estimated coe¢ cient on the value of the
19The gure only represents observed bids. Because the experiments were based on ascending auctions, we do
not observe the weak bidders bid when he wins a unit in the auction.
20The regression contains 440 observations, with standard errors clustered at the individual level.
14
weak bidder, 0.982, is not signicantly di¤erent from 1 (p = 0:689), while the constant is not
signicantly di¤erent from zero.
Weak Bid Coe¢ cient
(robust std. error)
p-value
Constant  0:172
(1:150)
0:881
vw 0:982
(0:044)
< 0:001
Table 4.1: Random e¤ects panel regression - Weak bidding.
The strong adherence of weak biddersbehavior to the theoretical prediction under no resale
conditions parallels previous experimental results of value bidding in ascending auctions (see,
for example, McCabe et al., 1990, and Alsemgeest et al., 1998).
Empirical Result 1: Without resale, weak bidders bid up to their valuations.
In the resale treatment with complete information (the upper right graph of Figure 4.1), it is
also clear that the addition of a resale market dramatically changed bids in the upward direction.
A Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney (WMW) test conrms this di¤erence in observed bids between the
no resale and complete information resale treatments (p < 0:001), providing empirical support
for Result 2.
Many of the observed bids, while certainly higher than value, still lie at or below 30  the
lowest possible value of the strong bidder. A plausible explanation is that since weak bidders
only had information regarding the competitors value distribution, they may not have wanted
to risk paying more than strong biddersvaluations.21 This is only a partial story, however,
since the scatterplot only contains observations for auctions where the weak bidder did not win
a unit.
In the resale treatment with incomplete information (the lower left graph of Figure 4.1),
more weak bidders chose to bid value than under complete information, yet they are also fre-
quently bidding above value as predicted by Result 2. However, the above-value bids under
incomplete information appear conservative as the majority fall below 30 and we observe more
losing bids than under complete information. Arguably, higher uncertainty about the outcome
of the resale market and the resale prot induced weak bidders to bid less aggressively with
incomplete information. Despite this more conservative speculation, we still nd signicant
di¤erences in observed bids between the no resale treatment and the incomplete information
resale treatment (p < 0:001) and fail to nd a signicant di¤erence between the incomplete and
complete information resale treatments (p = 0:240).
Notice that the graph for the incomplete information resale treatment contains more obser-
vations than the bargain and the complete information resale treatments and fewer observations
21For experimental analysis on the role of expectations in biddersdeviations from equilibrium strategies see
Reiss and Kirchkamp (2012) and Armantier and Treich (2009).
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than the no resale treatment, because weak bidders won more often in the bargain and the
complete information resale treatments and less often in auctions without a resale opportunity.
As we will show in Section 4.2, this is a consequence of the strong biddersstrategic behavior.
The nal resale treatment, bargain (lower right graph of Figure 4.1), resulted in the majority
of bids at value or above.22 This treatment appears to result in fewer aggressive bids, and
relatively more bids at value, especially when contrasted with resale under complete information.
The lack of aggressiveness in observed bids is conrmed by a WMW test that shows no signicant
di¤erence between bargain and no resale (p = 0:221), and signicant di¤erences between bargain
and either incomplete information resale or complete information resale (p  0:001).23
By Results 1 and 2, strong bidders should always let weak bidders win with resale, but
without resale they should only let weak bidders win if their unit value is less than 40. Table
4.2 provides the relative frequency of weak bidders winning a unit, overall and broken down by
the strong competitors value. Resale did result in the weak bidder winning a unit with higher
frequency than without resale, with the highest frequency obtained in the complete information
resale and bargain treatments. Even with resale, especially in the incomplete information resale
treatment, the weak bidder won a unit more often when the strong bidder had a value lower
than 40.
No Resale Comp Resale Incomp Resale Bargain
% auctions won by Weak 38.89% 75.00% 63.19% 73.13%
% auctions won when vS < 40 51.98% 76.84% 72.03% 74.09%
% auctions won when vS > 40 25.15% 72.42% 53.03% 70.59%
Table 4.2: Relative frequency of weak bidders winning 1 unit.
Formalizing the above results, table 4.3 presents random e¤ects tobit regression results on
bids for weak types. The use of a tobit model is appropriate because of the large number of
unobserved bids which are censored at the auction price whenever the weak bidder won a unit in
the auction. We report marginal e¤ects in addition to the tobit model estimates.24 The variable
vW represents the weak bidders valuation, while Comp Resale, Incomp Resale, and Bargain are
treatment dummies representing the resale treatments. The no resale treatment serves as our
baseline group and the variable Period, which tracks the period of play, is included in Model 2
22We include the plus marker in the bargain treatment scatterplot to indicate the dropout bids placed by a
single subject assigned to the weak role who consistently bid at 0 and 1 for the duration of the experiment. This
subjects bidding behavior is exceptional given the overall pattern of the data and is di¢ cult to rationalize, so
while this subjects data is included in all of the analysis and graphs that follow, we mark these observations in
the scatterplot as outliers.
23As the bargain treatment was run with fewer periods than the other three treatments (20 vs. 30 periods per
session), we have also conducted WMW tests on a restricted sample with 20 periods of data for each treatment.
All signicance results are the same for the restricted sample comparisons.
24Our form of the model may also be referred to as a censored normal regression model as the censoring point
may change in each observation (Wooldridge, 2001). Our reported marginal e¤ect = @E[bidjbid>price]
@xk
, where xk
represents the kth independent variable.
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to test for learning e¤ects over time.25
(1) (2)
Weak Bid Coe¢ cient Marginal
E¤ect
Coe¢ cient Marginal
E¤ect
Constant 0:870
(1:444)
1:064
(1:484)
vw 0:993
(0:053)
0:659 0:993
(0:053)
0:659
Comp Resale
(Comp)
13:248
(2:285)
8:793 13:245
(2:282)
8:788
Incomp Resale
(Incomp)
6:951
(2:162)
4:613 6:939
(2:160)
4:604
Bargain 6:747
(2:545)
4:478 6:665
(2:547)
4:422
Period  0:013
(0:023)
 0:008
vwComp  0:316
(0:092)
 0:209  0:318
(0:092)
 0:211
vwIncomp  0:117
(0:084)
 0:077  0:117
(0:084)
 0:077
vwBargain  0:236
(0:108)
 0:157  0:236
(0:108)
 0:157
Table 4.3: Random e¤ects panel tobit - Weak bidding.
The results of Model 1 demonstrate a strong positive e¤ect on weak bidders bids when
resale is possible, regardless of the form, conrming Result 2. While all three resale treatments
result in speculation by weak bidders, the strength of this e¤ect is strongest in the complete
information resale treatment. Interacting value with treatment provides evidence that in the
bargain and complete information resale treatments higher-value weak bidders bid slightly less
aggressively than lower-valued ones. While signicant, the magnitude of this e¤ect is relatively
small.
Empirical Result 2: Weak bidders bid higher with resale than without. Speculation by weak
bidders is highest in the complete information resale treatment.
Model 2 is included to test for any learning e¤ects and as a robustness check. We nd no
signicant learning e¤ect for weak bidders.26
4.2. Strong Type Bidding
By Results 1 and 2 in Section 2, without resale the strong bidder should win both units if his
value is higher than 2E [vW ] = 40 while he should reduce demand if his value is lower than 40.
25All regressions include 1023 uncensored observations and 1617 right-censored observations (at the auction
price). The numbers reported in parentheses are standard errors. Three (***), two (**), and one (*) stars
indicate statistical signicance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
26We also nd no signicant learning e¤ects in alternative model specications that include interactions of
period with treatments.
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Figure 4.2: Strong Bidding  weighted scatterplot of observed bids (dropouts) by strong
bidders versus valuations in the four treatments.
With resale the strong bidder should reduce demand across all values, regardless of the form of
the resale market or informational conditions.
Figure 4.2 plots weighted scatterplots of the observed strong biddersdropout bids against
per unit value. We again include a line to show where a bid would be equal to value. In the
no resale treatment (upper left graph of Figure 4.2) it is apparent that strong bidders dropped
out at low prices with much higher frequency for values lower than 40. This is evidenced in two
ways. First, we have larger clusters of zero bids for values below 40 and second, the number of
observed bids is also much higher (showing that strong bidders dropped out rst).
The remaining three graphs represent the resale treatments and provide visual evidence that
strong bidders reduced demand much more often, responding as theoretically predicted in Result
2, to the presence of resale. Not only is the frequency of bids lower than values high throughout
the resale treatments, but many of the bids are near the theoretical prediction of 0. Despite these
similarities, pairwise WMW tests nd signicant di¤erences between all three resale treatments
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Figure 4.3: Relative frequency of strong bidders winning both units, by strong biddersvalue,
in the four treatments.
(p < 0:001).27
To more accurately quantify the strong bidders response to both value location and the
presence of resale, Figure 4.3 graphs the relative frequency of the strong bidder winning both
units, broken down by value for all treatments. If a strong bidder reduced demand by dropping
out of the auction rst, he won 1 unit and the auction allocation was ine¢ cient, otherwise he
won both units in the auction. In the no resale treatment (rst graph of Figure 4.3), strong
bidders won 2 units more often when their value was higher than 40. A Kolmogorov-Smirnov
(K-S) test indicates that the observed di¤erence between strong bidders winning when their
value was above 40 and below 40 is statistically signicant (p < 0:001).
Turning to the resale treatments, it is immediately evident that the presence of resale re-
27For comparisons against the bargain treatment, both the full sample and restricted sample (20 periods per
session) result in highly signicant di¤erences. In the remainder of the results, except for the comparison of
cumulative earnings by type (Section 4.4), for all relevant comparisons of the bargain treatment to either no
resale, comp resale, or incomp resale we have run identical tests for the full sample (which is reported) and the
restricted sample (unreported). In all cases, our reported results are unchanged. For the case of cumulative
earnings, we only report results for the restricted set of 20 periods and note this di¤erence in the text accordingly.
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sulted in much higher frequencies of demand reduction, although this e¤ect is lessened under
incomplete information. We nd signicant di¤erences between the no resale treatment and all
resale treatments for both high and low values (K-S, vS < 40, p  0:007; vS > 40, p < 0:001).
Complete information resale and bargain appear most similar and we nd no signicant dif-
ferences between these treatments (p = 0:264). Between incomplete information resale and
either complete information resale or bargain, signicant di¤erences exist when vS was above 40
(p  0:001), but not when vS was below 40 (p  0:102).
In theory, a strong bidder who reduces demand should drop out at zero. Yet any bid below 10,
the lowest possible value of the weak bidder, can also be interpreted as strong demand reduction,
since weak bidders should never drop out at a price lower than their value. Table 4.4 summarizes
low-bidding behavior by strong bidders which is consistent with theory (conservatively dened
as bids lower than 3). In the no resale treatment, 30% of all bids were near-zero dropouts
when the strong bidder had a value less than 40. This percentage decreased substantially when
the strong bidder had a value greater than 40. There is no comparable decrease in the resale
treatments, but resale did result in the largest amount of near-zero bids, for both high and low
values, particularly in the bargain treatment.
Percentage of Bids  2 No Resale Comp Resale Incomp Resale Bargain
vS < 40 30% 37% 29% 48%
vS > 40 12% 40% 21% 41%
Table 4.4: Relative frequency of near-zero bids by strong bidders.
To examine strong biddersbehavior in more depth, we analyze random e¤ects tobit models
in Table 4.5.28 Model 1 is our primary model of treatment and value location e¤ects. Models
2 and 3 explore learning e¤ects. The strong bidders unit valuation is represented by vS , while
vS > 40 is a dummy variable indicating when the valuation was higher than 40. Comp Resale,
Incomp Resale, and Bargain identify treatment dummies, with the no resale case serving as the
baseline. Period represents the period of play.
In the no resale treatment, the positive signicant coe¢ cient on vS > 40 in Model 1 conrms
that strong biddersbid higher when their values were above 40, implying less demand reduction
when strong bidders had relatively high values. This provides empirical support for Result 1.
Empirical Result 3: Without resale, strong bidders reduce demand less with high value asym-
metry between bidders  i.e., when vS > 40.
Examining the e¤ects of resale, the signicant negative coe¢ cients on Comp Resale, Bargain,
and the interactions of Comp Resale and Bargain with vS > 40 indicate that in these treatments
there was more demand reduction than without resale across all values, and especially for high
28All regressions include 1646 uncensored observations and 994 right-censored observations (at the auction
price).
20
(1) (2) (3)
Strong Bid Coe¢ cient Marginal
E¤ect
Coe¢ cient Marginal
E¤ect
Coe¢ cient Marginal
E¤ect
Constant 0:078
(3:705)
7:745
(3:634)
5:016
(3:706)
vs 0:560
(0:086)
0:254 0:516
(0:082)
0:235 0:524
(0:082)
0:239
Comp Resale
(Comp)
 5:894
(3:031)
 2:681  5:832
(3:007)
 2:664  1:768
(3:240)
 0:806
Incomp Resale
(Incomp)
 2:635
(3:034)
 1:198  2:673
(3:010)
 1:221  1:318
(3:248)
 0:601
Bargain  8:615
(3:065)
 3:918  10:454
(3:045)
 4:775  5:047
(3:334)
 2:302
vs>40 4:721
(1:497)
2:147 7:287
(1:785)
3:328 6:576
(1:774)
3:000
Period  0:420
(0:041)
 0:192  0:264
(0:066)
 0:120
Compvs>40  8:621
(1:505)
 3:921  8:684
(1:433)
 3:966  8:044
(1:435)
 3:669
Incompvs>40  6:410
(1:538)
 2:915  6:546
(1:464)
 2:990  6:254
(1:465)
 2:853
Bargainvs>40  9:257
(1:682)
 4:211  10:445
(1:646)
 4:771  9:873
(1:639)
 4:504
CompPeriod  0:263
(0:081)
 0:119
IncompPeriod  0:084
(0:082)
 0:038
BargainPeriod  0:434
(0:114)
 0:198
vs>40Period  0:078
(0:063)
 0:035  0:067
(0:062)
 0:030
Table 4.5: Random e¤ects panel tobit - Strong bidding.
values. By contrast, the incomplete information resale treatment only resulted in signicantly
more demand reduction than no resale for values greater than 40.
Empirical Result 4:With high value asymmetry between bidders, strong bidders reduce demand
more with resale than without. With low value asymmetry between bidders, strong bidders reduce
demand more with resale than without only in the bargain and complete information resale
treatments. Demand reduction by strong bidders is highest in the bargain treatment.
Model 2 tests for learning e¤ects. As opposed to the results for weak bidders, learning plays
a signicant role for strong bidders. Over time, the signicant negative coe¢ cient on Period
indicates that strong bidders learned to reduce demand more. Model 3 decomposes this result
by treatment. There is signicant learning to reduce demand only in the complete information
resale and bargain treatments, with a stronger e¤ect in bargain. As we will show in Section 4.4,
resale is most successful in these treatments, so e¢ cient resale leads to reinforcement learning
in the direction of the theoretical predictions.
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4.3. E¢ ciency and Sellers Revenue
Auction e¢ ciency is measured as the ratio between the valuation of the auction winner and
the valuation of the strong bidder, which is the highest valuation. Since one unit was always
awarded to the strong bidder, we will focus on the e¢ ciency results for the second unit. Auction
e¢ ciency is lower than 1 when the weak bidder won the second unit because of demand reduction
or speculation.
When an auction is followed by a resale opportunity, the e¢ ciency generated by the auction
allocation can potentially change. We refer to the post-resale e¢ ciency as nal e¢ ciency, which
is measured as the ratio between the valuation of the nal holder of the good and the valuation
of the strong bidder. In our environment, nal e¢ ciency is 1 if the weak bidder resold to the
strong bidder after the auction; while nal e¢ ciency is equal to auction e¢ ciency if no resale
occurred. By Result 3 in Section 2, auction e¢ ciency should be lower with resale than without,
while nal e¢ ciency should always be 1 with resale, and higher than without resale.
Table 4.6 reports average e¢ ciency, by treatment. No resale resulted in the highest auction
e¢ ciency, due to low levels of demand reduction by strong bidders with higher values. Yet,
full e¢ ciency is not reached without resale because strong bidders with lower values still re-
duced demand. Pairwise WMW tests nd signicant di¤erences in auction e¢ ciency between
all treatments, except complete information resale and bargain (p = 0:519). Among the resale
treatments, incomplete information resale resulted in the highest auction e¢ ciency.
Resale improved e¢ ciency from the auction allocation to the nal allocation, most strikingly
when subjects were allowed to bargain or make take-it-or-leave it o¤ers with complete infor-
mation, consistent Result 3.29 Moreover, nal e¢ ciency in both the bargain and the complete
information resale treatments is higher than without resale. However, it is not necessarily the
case that resale always yielded higher nal e¢ ciency: no signicant di¤erence exists between nal
e¢ ciency in the no resale and the incomplete information resale treatments (WMW, p = 0:103).
No Resale Comp Resale Incomp Resale Bargain
Auction E¢ ciency 0:82
(0:241)
0:64
(0:256)
0:71
(0:258)
0:65
(0:261)
Final E¢ ciency 0:82
(0:241)
0:93
(0:170)
0:85
(0:217)
0:95
(0:132)
Table 4.6: Average auction and nal e¢ ciency (standard deviations in parentheses).
Figure 4.4 examines e¢ ciency through the relative frequency of the strong bidder holding 2
units after resale, depending on the strong biddersvalue. To show how the allocation changed
after the auction, we have overlaid the auction allocation seen previously in gure 4.3. Demand
reduction in all resale treatments resulted in low e¢ ciency after the auction, but resale increased
nal e¢ ciency. With complete information or bargaining, the second unit was almost always
29We nd no signicant di¤erences in nal e¢ ciency between the comp resale and bargain treatments (WMW,
p = 0:970).
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Figure 4.4: Relative frequency of nal allocation and auction allocation of 2 units to strong
bidder, by strong biddersvalue.
transferred to the strong bidder when the weak bidder won it in the auction, and there is no
statistically signicant di¤erence between the nal allocations in these two treatments (K-S,
p = 0:485). Resale under take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers with incomplete information also increased
e¢ ciency after the auction, but the nal allocation for this treatment was similar to the no resale
allocation. A K-S test conrms that there is no signicant di¤erence between the allocation in
the no resale treatment and the nal allocation in the incomplete information resale treatment
(p = 0:485).
Empirical Result 5: Auction e¢ ciency is lower with resale than without. Final e¢ ciency
without resale is lower than in the bargain and complete information resale treatments, but is
not signicantly di¤erent from the incomplete information resale treatment.
By Result 4 in Section 2, auction revenue should be higher without resale than with resale,
because resale induces demand reduction by strong bidders and hence reduces the auction price.
Table 4.7 reports average auction revenue per unit sold for each treatment, and by the type of
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the auction winner. The highest overall revenue was achieved in the no resale treatment, but
there is no signicant di¤erence between that revenue and the revenue in the incomplete infor-
mation resale treatment (WMW, p = 0:319). The reasoning behind the higher than expected
revenue with resale is straightforward: weak bidders bid more aggressively with resale, and this
increased the sellers revenue when strong bidders chose to win the auction rather than follow
their equilibrium strategy and reduce demand. By contrast, consistent with Result 4, we do nd
signicant di¤erences between the revenue in the no resale treatment and the revenues in the
complete information resale treatment (p < 0:001) and the bargain treatment (p < 0:001).
No Resale Comp Resale Incomp Resale Bargain
Average Sellers Revenue 14.61
(10.062)
11.94
(12.448)
14.05
(11.099)
8.47
(10.567)
Average Revenue - Weak Wins 8.01
(10.117)
8.64
(11.339)
9.98
(10.387)
5.25
(8.873)
Average Revenue - Strong Wins 18.81
(7.4 40)
21.85
(10.181)
21.06
(8.493)
17.22
(9.849)
Table 4.7: Average sellers revenue per unit (standard deviations in parentheses).
Empirical Result 6: The sellers revenue without resale is higher than in the complete in-
formation resale and bargain treatments, but is not signicantly di¤erent from the incomplete
information resale treatment.
Table 4.7 also shows that, in all treatments, the seller obtained a lower revenue when weak
bidders won a unit, so that the auction price was determined by strong biddersbids (rather
than weak biddersones), although strong bidders had a higher willingness to pay per unit. This
is consistent with the fact that strong bidders tended to reduce demand and bid lower than weak
bidders, with intentions to reduce the auction price.
4.4. Resale Market
In this section, we highlight key aspects of the resale market that underlie the empirical regular-
ities described previously for the resale treatments. Recall that the resale market either involved
a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er where the proposer was determined with 50/50 probability (complete
information and incomplete information resale), or placed bidders into an unstructured bargain-
ing game (bargain).
Table 4.8 provides the relative frequency of resale in all resale treatments, and breaks this
down into successful resale and failed resale. Successful resale took place when both participants
agreed to an o¤er while failed resale was either a result of one of the participants choosing to exit
the resale stage or failed agreement before time expired.30 It is immediately evident that resale
30 In the bargain treatment, we observed 72 cases of failed resale (out of 351 resale markets). Of these, 41 were
the result of time expiring while the remaining 31 failed because one of the two resale participants chose to exit
the stage.
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was more frequent and successful in the complete information resale and bargain treatments
than in the incomplete information resale treatment; there is no signicant di¤erence between
the rst two treatments in the frequencies of possible resale (2, p = 0:467) or success in resale
(p = 0:550). Incomplete information resale resulted in both a signicantly lower frequency of
possible resale (p < 0:001) and a signicantly higher rate of failed resale (p < 0:001). The
high occurrence of failed resale appears to depend on the mix of incomplete information and a
take-it-or-leave-it o¤er mechanism.
Resale Possible
(weak won)
Successful Resale Failed Resale
Comp Resale 75% 81:1% 18:9%
Incomp Resale 63:2% 42:2% 57:8%
Bargain 73:1% 79:5% 20:5%
Table 4.8: Relative frequency of possible resale (when the weak bidder won a unit the auction),
successful resale, and failed resale (out of Resale Possible).
From an e¢ ciency standpoint, it is important to understand which factors determined a
higher probability of successful resale in each resale mechanism. Table 4.9 provides marginal
e¤ects from probit regressions with agreement to nal resale as the dependent variable. Models
1 and 2 examine the complete and incomplete information resale treatments, respectively. The
variable O¤er represents the take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers. Auction Price represents the dropout price
from the auction, Auction Price>vW is a dummy variable indicating when the auction price was
greater than the weak bidders value (i.e., losses at the auction stage for the weak bidder),
and vS vW represents the di¤erence between the strong and weak values to capture the e¤ect
of varying asymmetry between bidders. Weak Proposer is a dummy variable which indicates
whether the proposer was the weak bidder.
The results indicate that, as expected, an increase in the o¤er made by a strong proposer
signicantly increased the probability of nal agreement by 2% in the complete information
resale treatment and by almost 4% in the incomplete information resale treatment. Similarly,
the interaction of o¤er with weak proposer is signicant and negative, showing that a reduction in
the o¤er made by a weak proposer increased the probability of acceptance by a strong responder.
We also nd a signicant and large positive e¤ect of weak bidders assigned to the proposer role
on the probability of agreement, arguably because weak bidders were less aggressive in the resale
market than strong bidders, as shown below.
Although in theory the prots from the auction should not a¤ect the resale market, in the
incomplete information treatment we nd a strong positive e¤ect when the auction price was
higher than the weak bidders value. Specically, if the weak bidder paid an auction price higher
than his value, incurring losses at the auction stage, the probability of resale agreement increased
by 13%. The size of the gains from trade vS vW had little impact under complete information,
but signicantly increased the success rate of resale in the incomplete information treatment,
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(1) (2) (3)
Final Resale Agreement Comp Resale Incomp Resale Bargain
O¤er 0:019
(0:005)
0:037
(0:013)
Initial Weak O¤er Initial Strong O¤er  0:011
(0:0005)
Auction Price  0:003
(0:003)
 0:0003
(0:001)
0:0001
(0:002)
Auction Price>vw 0:060
(0:082)
0:134
(0:067)
0:036
(0:101)
vsvw 0:004
(0:004)
0:022
(0:006)
0:011
(0:001)
Weak Proposer 0:651
(0:037)
0:705
(0:193)
O¤erWeak Proposer  0:021
(0:005)
 0:032
(0:015)
Auction PriceWeak Proposer  0:003
(0:002)
 0:003
(0:001)
# O¤ers Made  0:009
(0:005)
Observations 534 445 344
Clusters 3 3 3
Table 4.9: Marginal e¤ects from Probit regressions on resale of unit (nal resale agreement),
conditional on weak winning. Standard errors clustered at the session level.
likely because it increased the range of potential o¤ers that led to positive prot in the resale
market for both participants.
Turning to the bargain treatment in Model 3, we restructured the estimated model to account
for the di¤erent resale mechanism. Because of the unstructured process of the bargain treatment,
we typically observe a series of alternating o¤ers rather than a single o¤er. To determine the role
of o¤ers under bargaining, we take the rst o¤er made by both strong and weak bidders, and
di¤erence these. If agreement was reached with a single initial o¤er, this di¤erence is dened
as zero. We also include a variable, # O¤ers Made, which tracks the total number of o¤ers
made by a bargaining pair. We nd that the distance between the weak and strong initial o¤ers
negatively impacted the probability of nal agreement: every 1 unit increase in distance implied
a 1.1% decrease in the probability of acceptance. We also nd a signicant, but relatively weak
negative e¤ect for the number of o¤ers made. As in the incomplete information resale treatment,
higher value asymmetry increased the probability of successful resale.
Empirical Result 7: Resale is more likely to succeed when the weak bidder has more bargaining
power, with more information in the resale market, larger gains from trade, and exibility in the
bargaining mechanism. Bidders trade most often (when it is e¢ cient to do so) in the bargain
and complete information resale treatments.
Table 4.10 summarizes average resale prices, earnings (measured as the distance between the
resale price and the bidders value), and proposed o¤ers by type of bidder. Resale prices were
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signicantly higher in complete information resale than either bargain (WMW, p < 0:001) or
incomplete information resale (p < 0:001). For bargain and incomplete information resale, the
di¤erence is not signicant (p = 0:437). There are also signicant di¤erences in earnings between
strong and weak bidders in all treatments, but the relationship is statistically weaker for the
complete information resale treatment (p = 0:065) than the incomplete information resale and
bargain treatments (p < 0:001). Hence, weak bidders obtained a lower prot than strong bidders
in the resale market, but managed to obtain relatively higher prots with complete information
where prots were closer to equal splits of the resale surplus.31 Di¤erences in earnings were
mainly driven by strong bidders making more aggressive o¤ers in the resale market, especially
with incomplete information. Contrasting the o¤ers for the take-it-or-leave-it treatments, strong
proposers made signicantly lower o¤ers under incomplete information (p < 0:001), while we
nd no signicant di¤erences between o¤ers made by the weak proposers (WMW, p = 0:345).
Resale Price Weak Earnings Strong Earnings Resale O¤er
Weak / Strong
Comp Resale 29.56
(5.619)
9.45
(5.527)
10.20
(5.749)
32.47
(4.664)
=25.45
(6.240)
Incomp Resale 27.38
(7.686)
8.74
(7.964)
12.59
(7.635)
32.45
(6.911)
=17.93
(7.035)
Bargain 27.44
(4.474)
8.35
(5.866)
12.43
(6.559)
-
Table 4.10: Average resale prices, resale earnings, and o¤ers by type (standard deviations in
parentheses).
Comparing average resale prices from Table 4.10 to average auction prices (which are equiv-
alent to the sellers revenue) from Table 4.7 it is clear that, in all treatments with resale, on
average, auction prices are lower than resale prices. This di¤erence is particularly large in auc-
tions where the weak bidder wins and there is pronounced demand reduction by strong bidders;
but resale prices are also higher than auction prices even when the strong bidder wins and
the auction is not followed by a resale market. Signed rank sum tests by treatment conrm
signicant di¤erences between the auction and resale prices for all resale treatments (p < 0:001).
Finally, Table 4.11 reports total biddersprots  i.e., auction earnings plus resale earnings
 by types and treatments. As these earnings are cumulative, for comparisons to the bargain
treatment we restrict all treatments to 20 periods of data. Pairwise WMW tests nd signicant
earnings di¤erences for both weak (p < 0:001) and strong bidders (p  0:003) across all treat-
ments. Weak bidders obtain higher prots when resale is allowed, because of the option value
of selling the units acquired after the auction. By contrast, strong bidders obtain higher prots
when resale is allowed only when the resale market is su¢ ciently e¢ cient, so that they manage
to trade with high probability after the auction.
31 In the resale treatments with take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers, the bidder who is chosen as the proposer should make
an o¤er that makes (actually or in expectation) the other bidder just indi¤erent between accepting or rejecting
it, and hence obtain the whole resale surplus. So, in expectation, a bidder should obtain half of the gains from
trade in the resale market.
27
No Resale Comp Resale Incomp Resale Bargain
Weaks Prot 4.61
(8.823)
12.45
(14.273)
7.55
(10.795)
15.83
(12.620)
Strongs Prot 38.33
(17.061)
37.43
(18.348)
34.93
(17.905)
44.62
(17.147)
Table 4.11: Average bidderstotal prots (standard deviations in parentheses).
Despite the option value of resale, there are two reasons why the presence of a resale market
may reduce strong bidders prot: (i) resale induces strong bidders to give up a unit in the
auction much more often, even though they may not manage to buy that unit in the resale
market; (ii) buying a unit in the auction is more costly with resale, because weak bidders bid
more aggressively.
5. Conclusion
It is often argued that resale should always be allowed after an auction, because it favors a more
e¢ cient allocation of the objects on sale. The possibility of resale, however, also a¤ects bidders
strategies in the auction and the sellers revenue. We use controlled laboratory experiments
to analyze the e¤ects of post-auction resale and asymmetries among bidders in multi-object
auctions, with varying information conditions and resale mechanisms.
Our experimental results provide strong qualitative support for the bidding strategies pre-
dicted by theory in multi-object uniform-price auctions. First, without resale, bidders reduce
demand less when they have a relatively higher valuation than competitors. Second, with re-
sale, bidders who expect to sell in the resale market (weak bidders) tend to speculate by bidding
at prices that are higher than their valuations, while bidders who expect to buy in the resale
market (strong bidders) reduce demand much more often than without resale, especially when
they have high valuations. So the possibility of resale motivates both strong and weak bidders
to bid further away from their values. These results are robust to di¤erent resale mechanisms,
but the magnitude of the response to resale depends on the properties of the resale market.
Specically, higher uncertainty about the resale markets outcome (due to a less exible resale
mechanism and the availability of less information) induces weak bidders to speculate less and
strong bidders to reduce demand less.
As commonly argued, resale does increase e¢ ciency ex-post, once the auction is terminated,32
but our analysis shows that resale also a¤ects biddersstrategies during the auction in ways that
tend to reduce auction e¢ ciency, and ultimately nal e¢ ciency as resale may fail even in the
presence of gains from trade (for example due to frictions created by asymmetric information or
the actual resale mechanism). Arguably, in our experiments resale was more likely to succeed
because subjects knew there were mutual gains from trade whenever they had a chance to
32Of course, the possibility of resale has an even stronger positive e¤ect on nal e¢ ciency when potential buyers
may not participate in the auction or when the order of biddersvaluations may change after the auction.
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trade in the resale market. In a more realistic environment where bidders may be unsure about
the presence of gains from trade, post-auction resale may be even more ine¢ cient than in our
experiments.
Moreover, as predicted by theory, the possibility of resale tends to reduce the sellers rev-
enue because it provides a chance to exploit mutual gains from trade among bidders after the
auction.33 However, resale also tends to induce weak bidders to speculate, which actually in-
creases the sellers revenue when strong bidders do not reduce demand. In our experiments,
revenue is highest both without resale and with incomplete information resale, while bargaining
or complete information resale leads to lower revenue.
When interpreting the e¤ect of resale on the sellers revenue, it must be noted that our
analysis assumes a xed number of bidders while the possibility of resale is likely to a¤ect
participation in the auction. In fact, in the presence of entry costs, weak bidders may be more
willing to participate when they are allowed to resell since, as we have shown, they obtain
higher prot in this case. Resale may even attract pure speculators who have no use value
for the objects on sale. This tends to increase competition and hence the sellers revenue. By
contrast, whether strong bidders prefer an auction with or without resale depends on the actual
resale mechanism adopted by bidders. In sum, our experimental results suggest that allowing
resale in multi-object auctions is not guaranteed to increase e¢ ciency nor does it necessarily
reduce the sellers revenue.
Similar to what has been observed in many real-world auctions followed by active resale
markets, in our experiments resale prices are signicantly higher than auction prices, precisely
because players who are willing to acquire multiple objects choose to trade in the resale market
rather than compete aggressively in the auction in order to pay lower auction prices.
The outcome of the resale market depends on the actual mechanism adopted by bidders to
trade and on the information available to bidders. Specically, more information, a dynamic
and more exible bargaining mechanism, more bargaining power for the resale seller, and larger
gains from trade all tend to increase the probability of successful resale. More information also
tends to increase the resale price and the resulting resale prot obtained by the resale seller,
although the resale seller always obtains lower prots than the resale buyer. A more e¢ cient
resale market, however, also tends to reduce the sellers revenue in the auction, since it makes
strong bidders more willing to reduce demand and trade after the auction. Consequently, a
market designer may face a trade-o¤ between higher post-resale e¢ ciency and higher auction
e¢ ciency and sellers revenue.
33Demand reduction leading to low auction prices can be interpreted as implicit collusion among bidders and
the resale market as a device through which bidders implement side payments, thus facilitating collusion.
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A. Appendix
A.1. Sample Instructions - Bargain Treatment
Thank you for participating in todays experiment. I will read through a script to explain to
you the nature of todays experiment as well as how to work the computer interface you will
be using. I will be using this script to make sure that all sessions of this experiment receive
the same information, but please feel free to ask questions as they arise. We ask that everyone
please refrain from talking or looking at the monitors of other subjects during the experiment.
If you have a question or problem please raise your hand and one of us will come to you. I also
ask that you please turn o¤ your cell phones.
General information: The purpose of this experiment is to study how people make decisions
in a particular situation. You will receive $10 for showing up on time for the experiment. You
will also make additional money during todays experiment. Upon completion of the experiment
the amount that you make will be paid to you in cash. Payments are condential; no other
participant will be told the amount you make. All amounts in this phase of the experiment are
denominated in experimental currency units, ECUs. ECUs will transform into real dollars at the
rate of $0.01 per ECU. These earnings are in addition to the show-up fee. In this experiment,
you will be a bidder in a series of auctions. Please hit continue for general instructions. Please
do not hit continue again until after I have nished with all instructions for this screen.
In this experiment, we will create a market in which you will act as a bidder in a sequence
of auctions. Each auction has two identical units of a hypothetical item for sale. You will be
bidding in the auction against one other person. At the end of each auction there will be the
possibility of the winner reselling the item to the other person. The person you are matched
with to bid against will be randomly chosen at the start of each auction and will therefore be
di¤erent across auctions. Each auction will always have two bidders: a 1-unit bidder and a
2-unit bidder. The 1-unit bidder can purchase only 1 unit of the item and will be assigned a
single value for one (1) unit. The 2-unit bidder can purchase up to 2 units of the item and will
be assigned a single value for each of the two (2) units. For both types of bidders, these values
represent the value of the good to you - what we will pay you for any items purchased. Please
hit continue for information on roles, values, and resale. Again, please do not hit continue until
I have nished with all instructions for this screen.
You were randomly assigned a role of 1-unit bidder or 2-unit bidder, which is listed at the
top of your screen. The possible values for the 2-unit bidder are the integers between 30 and 50,
with all values being equally likely, and the possible values for the 1-unit bidder are the integers
between 10 and 30, again all values are equally likely. If you are a 1-unit bidder, you will be
bidding against a 2-unit bidder and vice versa. If the 1-unit bidder purchases a unit, they will
have the opportunity to resell it to the 2-unit bidder. If the 2-unit bidder purchases a unit, they
will not resell it because they have a higher value than the 1-unit bidder. Please press continue
again to work with the auction interface. What you should see is a at example screen. Please
do not hit continue until I have nished with all instructions for this screen.
What you should see in front of you is a sample of the screen you will see for this auction.
The left side of the screen contains boxes that have instructions and payo¤s. On the right side
of the screen you will see the primary auction interface. Beside the word Auctionin the top
line, you will see the number of units you can win (called Units Demanded). Below that you
will see what your value is for a unit in ECUs for this auction (remember your value is what
we will pay you for each unit won). Underneath your value, you will see a bid clock. This clock
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Figure A.1: Sample auction screen (weak bidder).
shows the current price in the auction and will steadily count up. The clock is not increasing
now, because this is just an example screen. If this were the actual auction, the clock would be
ticking up by 1 ECU per second. Both bidders begin the round inthe auction. As the price
increases on the bid clock, you can click on the Drop Outbutton to drop out of the auction at
any point of your choosing. Note that drop out choices are irreversible so as soon as any bidder
presses the drop out button, the auction will end and the time on the clock will be the auction
price. After the auction, there may be an opportunity for reselling the object.
Payo¤s: If the 1-unit bidder drops out rst, the 2-unit bidder wins both units in the auction
and there is no resale because the 2-unit bidder has the highest value. In this case, the 2-unit
bidder will earn the di¤erence between their value and the auction price, for each unit. The
1-unit bidder will earn zero. If the 2-unit bidder drops out rst, the 1-unit bidder wins one unit,
and the 2-unit bidder also wins 1 unit. In this case, each bidder will earn the di¤erence between
their value and the auction price for the unit they won. In addition, because the 2-unit bidder
has the highest value, the 1-unit bidder will have the opportunity to resell the unit they won in
the auction to the 2-unit bidder. Please press continue again to work with the resale interface.
Resale: If resale is possible because the 1-unit bidder won 1 unit, both bidders automatically
enter the resale stage. What you should see in front of you is a sample of the screen you will
see in resale. If you were a 1-unit bidder in the auction, you will always be the seller in the
resale stage. If you were a 2-unit bidder in the auction, you will always be the buyer in the
resale stage. These roles are now dened by the bolded sentence at the top left of the screen.
If you are the buyer, you have the opportunity to purchase the 2nd unit from the seller and
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Figure A.2: Sample resale screen (weak seller).
if you are the seller, you have the opportunity to sell the unit you won in the auction to the
buyer. Immediately below this, you will see a reminder of your value for the unit and the range
of potential values for the other resale participant you are bargaining with. Your value and
the other participants value remain identical to the values you both had in the auction stage.
Immediately below this, still on the left side of the screen is the resale payo¤ information. For
resale to occur, both the buyer and seller must agree to a resale o¤er. If they agree to a resale
o¤er, the seller will earn the di¤erence between the resale price and their value. The buyer will
earn the di¤erence between their value and the resale price. If no resale o¤er is agreed to, both
the buyer and seller earn 0 in this stage. Any earnings from the resale stage are in addition to
the earnings from the auction.
Resale o¤ers are made at the top right of the screen. To make an o¤er, type in the price
you would like to o¤er into the blue box and click Make O¤er.Once you make this o¤er, it
will immediately appear in the box below under the label, Your O¤er.Any o¤ers made by the
other resale participant to you will also appear in this box on the right hand side. Please input
any o¤er amount into the blue box and press Make O¤er.You should see that your o¤er box
has updated with the o¤er you input. You should also see the other participants o¤er to you
once they have made their o¤er. Please now input another o¤er and click Make O¤erto see
that your o¤er has changed. To accept the o¤er of the other participant, click on their o¤er,
which will highlight in blue and then click Accept.You can only accept o¤ers made by the
other participant. Currently, the Accept button is disabled because this is an example screen,
but when either the buyer or seller agree to an o¤er by pressing this button, the resale stage
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will immediately terminate. Prior to agreement, o¤ers can be changed at anytime.
You have two tools to facilitate your resale decisions. The rst is chat, located at the bottom
right hand side of the screen. Messages can be sent to the other participant in this box. Please
type a message now, for example, hello and press enter. You will see that your message
has popped up and is identiable by the label, YOU. If your practice partner has also sent
a message, that message should have popped-up in the box and is identiable by their role
of either BUYER or SELLER. Make sure that you hit enter after you have typed a message
for it to be sent. We also ask that throughout the experiment you do not provide identiable
information about yourself to the other participant. In addition to chat, you will also have
access to the scrollbar seen on the left side of the screen. You can use the scrollbar to determine
your payo¤ for a given o¤er. The minimum possible resale o¤er is 10, and the maximum is 50.
You can choose any resale price between these two values by sliding the scrollbar, or clicking
on the right and left arrows, which will increase and decrease the resale price. Please move the
scrollbar now. You should now see that information has appeared below the scrollbar, which
will be automatically updated as you move the scrollbar. The resale o¤er is given directly below
the scrollbar. Below the o¤er, you are given your resale prot for that given o¤er. Directly
below your prot, you are given the probability that the other participants resale prot will
be positive for that particular o¤er. If you would like to exit resale, there is a button at the
bottom left of the screen that you can click to choose to exit the resale stage at any time. You
will have 180 seconds (3 minutes) to agree to an o¤er with the other participant. The time will
be indicated in the middle of the right side of the screen, above chat. If an o¤er is not accepted
either by you or the other participant before time expires, no resale will occur. Please press Exit
Resale to continue.
Please follow along with example 1, as we go through a sample auction. Please note that
this example is for explanatory purposes only and is not intended to suggest how you should
make decisions. If you are a 1-unit bidder, your value is 25 and if you are the 2-unit bidder,
your value is 35. In this example, the 1-unit bidder will drop out rst at a price of 20, so the
2-unit bidder (who doesnt drop out) will win both units in the auction. We will now play this
auction out. When you click continue, you will immediately be taken into the auction with the
live bid clock. On the next screen, the 1-unit bidder should drop out when the auction price
hits 20. The 2-unit bidder should not click the drop out button. Please click continue to enter
the practice auction.
(Once in auction screen) You will now see the bid clock ticking up. The 1-unit bidder should
press the drop out button once the bid clock has reached a price of 20. The 2-unit bidder should
not click the drop out button.
(After 20 seconds and bidder has dropped out.) If you dropped out at a price other than
20, the computer assumed the drop out price was 20 for example purposes. You should now see
that the auction has ended because the drop-out button disappeared. You will also be told of
the auction price. Please click continue to be taken to the results summary.
You should now see the results screen for this practice auction. The 2-unit bidder won both
units in the auction because the 1-unit bidder dropped out rst. The 1-unit bidder did not
win a unit. Since the 2-unit bidder won both units and has a higher value, there is no resale.
Earnings for example 1: Notice that the auction price of the item is equal to the drop out price
of 20 made by the 1-unit bidder. The 2-unit bidder won two units. For each unit, the 2-unit
bidders earnings are the di¤erence between their value, 35, and the auction price, 20, so the
2-unit bidder earns 15 for each unit and the total payo¤ for both units won is 30. The 1-unit
bidder earns zero because they did not win a unit. Please click continue as we will now go
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through an example where the 2-unit bidder drops out rst.
Example 2: Recall, if you are a 1-unit bidder your value for this example is 25 and if you
are a 2-unit bidder your value is 35. In this example, the 2-unit bidder will drop out rst at a
price of 20, so the 1-unit bidder (who doesnt drop out) will win one unit in the auction and
the 2-unit bidder will win the other unit. We will now play this auction out. When you click
continue, you will be immediately taken into the auction with the live bid clock. On the next
screen, the 2-unit bidder should drop out when the auction price hits 20. The 1-unit bidder
should not click the drop out button. Please click continue to enter the next practice auction.
(Once in auction screen) Remember, the 2-unit bidder should try to drop out at a price of
20. The 1-unit bidder should not click the drop out button.
(After 20 seconds and bidder has dropped out) Again, if the 2-unit bidder dropped out at
a price di¤erent from 20, the computer assumed a drop out of 20 for example purposes. The
auction is now over, and since the 2-unit bidder dropped out rst, the 2-unit bidder won one
unit and the 1-unit bidder won one unit. Because the 2-unit bidder has the highest value, there
will be a resale stage where the 1-unit bidder will have the opportunity to resell the item to the
2-unit bidder, but rst you will be taken to an auction summary screen. Please click continue
to be taken to the pre-resale auction results summary.
Both bidders won a unit in the auction and paid a price equal to the 2-unit bidders drop
out price of 20. The 1-unit bidder earned the di¤erence between their value, 25 and the price
20, for auction prot equal to 5. The 2-unit bidder earned the di¤erence between their value
35 and the price paid in the auction, 20, for auction prot equal to 15. This pre-resale results
screen will also remind you of your role in resale. The 1-unit bidder is always the seller in the
resale market, while the 2-unit bidder is always the buyer. Please click continue to be taken to
resale stage.
Assume in the resale stage that both resale participants agree to a resale price of 32. To see
how accepting an o¤er works, please input an o¤er of 32 and click Make O¤er.Once the other
participant has input a price of 32, you will see that update as well. To agree to the o¤er made
by the other participant, click on the o¤er given. You will know you have selected the o¤er
once it highlights in blue. During the actual paid resale games, you do not have to both input
the same o¤er for resale agreement; this is only for practice purposes. Please note that either
role can accept and make o¤ers, and it is only necessary for 1 o¤er to be made and accepted
for resale to take place. After selecting the o¤er, click the Accept button. Once an accept
decision is made, resale ends and you should be now taken to the results screen.
You should now see the results screen which summarizes your auction prot at the top and
your resale prot at the bottom. The sellers resale prot is 7, which is the di¤erence between
the resale price, 32, and their value, 25. The buyers resale prot is 3, which is the di¤erence
between their value, 35, and the resale price, 32. Total earnings are equal to auction prot plus
resale prot.
Last informational points: Note that it is possible to lose money in the auction or in resale.
The 2-unit bidder loses money if they purchase a unit at a price that is higher than their value.
The 1-unit bidder loses money if they purchase a unit in the auction but the resale price is
lower than the auction price. You will all begin this phase of the experiment with a balance of
150 ECUs. This balance will increase as you make prots and decrease when you make losses.
Should you lose enough money that this balance becomes negative; you will be reset with your
initial balance once, and continue participating. If you go bankrupt a second time, you will be
removed from the experiment and paid your show-up fee only. Ties: If both bidders dropped out
at the exact same time, the computer will randomly select a winner to break the tie. Random
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Groups: You will be randomly re-assigned to a new group each period. There will always be two
people in your group, and the other bidder will be the opposite role. At some point, because of
the software, we may have a group nish before another. This does not imply any advantage
in payments and we ask that you please wait patiently for the others to nish. Please press
Continue.
We are now about to take a short quiz to ensure you understand the instructions. When
you have nished the quiz, please press continue again to check your answers. If you have an
incorrect answer for one of the questions, a pop-up will notify you which question was answered
incorrectly. Please correct your incorrect answer and hit continue again until all questions have
been answered correctly. Once everyone has completed this quiz, the experiment will continue.
Figure A.3: Weak quiz.
(After Quiz) Are there any questions? We are about to begin the actual auctions that you
will be paid for. Before each auction round, you will see this pause screen which will inform you
of your value for the next round. You will now begin the paid rounds. You are participating
at your own pace. Please follow the on-screen instructions. Please also make sure that when a
continue button is available, you click it whenever you are ready so the experiment can continue.
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Figure A.4: Strong quiz.
A.2. Additional Screenshots
The following gures are sample screenshots for No Resale, Complete Information Resale, and
Incomplete Information Resale.
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Figure A.5: Auction screenshot, no resale treatment  weak bidder.
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Figure A.6: Auction screenshot, comp resale and incomp resale  strong bidder.
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Figure A.7: Resale screenshot, incomp resale  weak proposer.
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Figure A.8: Resale screenshot, incomp resale  strong responder.
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